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Abstract: 
Using firm-level data from Bulgaria and Romania, this paper addresses a lacuna in the 
transition literature, namely, the link of firm-level employment turnover with firm-level 
growth in labour productivity. The results suggest that while net job creation at the firm 
level was affected by privatization in Bulgaria, privatization in Romania did not have any 
effect on firm-level employment growth. Further, Olley-Pakes (1996) decomposition 
indicates that in Bulgaria, over time, resources moved from less productive firms to more 
productive firms in almost all industries, but that in Romania such a phenomenon was 
observed in less than half of the industries. At the same time, the Grilliches-Regev (1995) 
decomposition indicates that in both these countries mobility of labour across firms, i.e., 
the process of job creation and job destruction at the firm level, contributed more to 
productivity changes than did other firm-level characteristics and industry-level factors 
affecting productivity. Finally, we find that the rate of employment changes in Bulgarian 
firms has a significant impact on the country’s firm-level productivity changes. 
Regressions using Romania data, however, do not provide any support for this 
observation.    3
1. Introduction 
Since the outset of the transition, economists have been attracted to two interesting issues 
related to the reforming industrial sectors of the transition economies. On the one hand, 
they have explored the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, and its impact on 
job flows, i.e., both job losses and creation of new jobs in general. The processes of job 
creation and job destruction are important at two different levels. If we make the 
reasonable assumption that efficiently run firms grow over time, and vice versa, labour, a 
key productive resource, moves from low productivity firms to high productivity firms 
over time, as the former downsize and exit, and the latter prosper and expand operations. 
At the same time, the net jobs created have an impact on the rate of unemployment 
which, in turn, has an impact on the rate of structural reforms itself. Specifically, as 
argued by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), if jobs created by the emerging, and presumably 
more efficient, private sector (in transition economies) are unable to absorb the labourers 
who lose their jobs in the declining state sector, the sharp rise in unemployment makes 
the process of further reforms more difficult, as the political consensus shifts against 
market-oriented structural reforms. 
 
In the wake of the economic (and political) changes in Central and Easter Europe (CEE) 
and the former Soviet republics, economists have closely scrutinized the phenomenon of 
simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs across industries in the transition 
economies (Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer, 1996; Bilsen and Konings, 1998; Konings 
and Walsh, 1999a, 1999b; Acquiste and Lehmann, 2000; Faggio and Konings, 2001; 
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2002; Konings and Xavier, 2002; Konings, Kupets and   4
Lehmann, 2003). Not surprisingly, given the macroeconomic trends in the transition 
economies, these studies found that both state-owned and privatized firms destroy a 
significant number of jobs. However, the privatized firms are much better at 
simultaneously creating new job opportunities than their state-owned counterparts. These 
studies concur that most of the new job opportunities in these countries are created by the 
de novo firms. Further, size of firms and growth in terms of employment are found to be 
negatively related.
1 However, there is no consensus about the impact of competition on 
the nature on job flows; the relationship between competition and the extent of net job 
creation seems to vary across countries, sectors and time. 
 
The second issue pertaining to industrial reforms in the transition economies that has 
attracted the attention of economists is the impact of restructuring, largely by way of 
changes in ownership of firms, greater competition and foreign direct investment, on 
firm- and industry-level productivity (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 2000; 
Estain et al., 2001; Grosfeld and Tressel, 2001; Warzynski, 2001). These studies have 
concluded that better corporate governance, often by way of privatization, creation of de 
novo firms, and foreign ownership of enterprises, complement competition in enhancing 
firm- and industry-level productivity. However, studies linking firm-level job flows with 
firm-level productivity changes are largely absent, even though jobs flows (or labour 
turnover) manifest the extent to which firms respond to structural reforms within 
industries, and within the economy, in general. Indeed, the industry-level study of 
Warzynski (2003) is the only paper linking these two consequences of firm- and industry-
                                                 
1  Konings and Xavier (2002) argue that the relationship between size and employment growth is non-
linear, and, indeed, represents an inverted U relationship.   5
level structural changes, namely, labour turnover and productivity. It argues that 
competition spurs both employment and productivity growth.  
 
However, Warzynski’s (2003) study suffers from two shortcomings. First, it does not 
take into account the fact that competition can affect the behaviour of different types of 
firms differently. Specifically, while competition is likely to induce privately owned 
firms to focus more on productivity, and take steps that would augment their 
productivity, state-owned enterprises may not be affected in this way in the presence of 
soft budget constraints and political imperatives. Secondly, by undertaking an industry-
level analysis, it bypasses the potentially rich within-industry variations across firms. 
 
The aim of this paper is to address the lacunae in the broader literature and Warzynski’s 
(2003) study with a detailed empirical study linking firm-level job flows and firm-level 
productivity changes in Bulgaria and Romania, two transition economies that have 
received scant attention from transition economists. The results suggest that while net job 
creation at the firm level was affected by privatization in Bulgaria, privatization in 
Romania did not have any effect on firm-level employment growth. In other words, 
during 1995-99, an average firm in Romania was at a more primitive state of transition 
than its counterpart in Bulgaria,
2 and hence less responsive to structural changes than the 
latter. Not surprisingly, therefore, Olley-Pakes (1996) decomposition indicates that in 
Bulgaria, over time, resources moved from less productive firms to more productive 
firms in almost all industries, but that in Romania such a phenomenon was observed in 
                                                 
2  The logic of this argument, explained later in some detail, owes its origin to Bilsen and Konings (1998) 
and Faggio (2001).   6
less than half the industries. At the same time, the Grilliches-Regev (1995) 
decomposition indicates that in both these countries mobility of labour across firms, i.e., 
the process of job creation and job destruction at the firm level, contributed more to 
productivity changes than other firm-level characteristics and industry-level factors 
affecting productivity. This result finds further support from regressions based on the 
Bulgarian data which suggest that rate of employment changes in Bulgarian firms have a 
significant impact on the country’s firm-level productivity changes. Regressions using 
Romania data, however, do not provide any support for this observation. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The data are described and discussed in 
some detail in Section 2. Section 3 highlights the research methodology, and the 




The data for the analysis have largely been obtained from Amadeus, which provides us 
with information about firm-level employment, operating revenue, and ownership 
patterns. The Amadeus data were also used to generate Herfindahl indices for all NACE1 
2-digit industries, these indices being proxy for the extent of competition in these 
industries. The data spans 5 years, namely, 1995 through 1999. The samples for Bulgaria 
and Romania include information on 1011 firms and 1402 firms respectively. The firms 
included in the sample account for more than 60 percent of sales and employment in the 
industrial sectors of these countries during each of the years.   7
 
Our final sample comprises only of firms that were in operation during all 5 years. We 
were not able to include the firms which did not report firm-level employment for each of 
these years because the nature of Amadeus data makes it difficult to distinguish between 
new firms entering the market, firms exiting the market, firms changing their names, and 
those simply not reporting the statistics. Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Konings and Xavier 
(2001) have demonstrated that the construction of the sample on the basis of continuing 
operation during all years under investigation does not lead to any bias in so far as 
estimation of regression models with employment growth as the dependent variable is 
concerned. Even though this does not eliminate the possibility of bias in so far as 
estimation of regression models with (labour) productivity as the dependent variable, in 
the absence of clear indication about the identity of entering and exiting firms, we shall 
proceed with this filter for the construction of the sample for our analysis. 
 
The descriptive statistics obtained from the data are reported in Table 1. It can easily be 
seen that in Bulgaria there are clear hierarchies with respect to both employment stock 
and productivity, the latter being defined as operating revenue per labourer.
3 The foreign 
owned firms are the largest, followed by the private firms and firms with mixed 
ownership respectively, and the state-owned firms are the smallest. The hierarchy in 
terms of productivity is the same. The data also suggests that the average firm within 
each ownership group was downsizing across all years in Bulgaria. These observations 
                                                 
3  This measure of labour productivity is fairly stylized. See, for example, Grilliches and Regev (1995) and 
Warzynski (2003).   8
are consistent with the literature linking productivity and firm-level restructuring with 
ownership patterns. 
 
In Romania, however, there are no such clear patterns or hierarchies. The state-owned 
firms are the largest and also the least productive. Foreign-owned firms, not surprisingly, 
are most productive, and privately owned firms are more productive than the firms with 
mixed ownership. However, there is no significant difference between the state-owned 
firms and those with mixed ownership. In other words, while privatization, especially to 
foreign owners, seem to have worked, at least in so far as augmentation of productivity is 
concerned, firms with mixed ownerships continue to behave like state-owned firms, i.e., 
any government ownership in Romania renders a firm reluctant to restructure. Further, 
unlike in Bulgaria, Romanian state-owned firms did not downsize much during 1995-99, 




The data were used to decompose productivity changes in Bulgaria and Romania, and the 
results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.
5 The Olley-Pakes (1992) 
decomposition suggests that, in Bulgaria, productive resources were channeled towards 
more productive firms in almost all the industries.
6 In Romania, on the other hand, this 
                                                 
4  The differences in the privatization processes and structural reforms, in general, between Bulgaria and 
Romania, are outlined in Appendix I. 
5  We have used both the Olley-Pakes and Grilliches-Regev methods of decomposition. The logic and 
algebra of these decompositions have been highlighted in Appendix II. 
6  How can we interpret the Olley-Pakes decomposition results reported in Tables 2 and 3? Let us, for 
example, focus on the food and beverages industry in Bulgaria (Table 2). The weighted average 
productivity for this industry, for the 1995-99 period, is 10.25. The values for unweighted average 
productivity and cross productivity for the same period are 10.13 and 0.15 respectively. The fact that cross 
productivity is positive implies that, during 1995-99, resources were concentrated largely among the high-  9
efficiency-augmenting phenomenon was observed only in about 40 percent of the 
industries. This is consistent with our earlier observation that privatization was perhaps 
more effective, and structural reforms more complete in Bulgaria than in Romania. 
 
The Grilliches-Regev (1995) decomposition suggests that in both these countries changes 
in productivity are driven largely by flow of labour across firms rather than by firm-
characteristics like ownership.
7 This is in sharp contrast with findings from developed (or 
more industrialized) countries like Israel. In these countries, much of the changes in 
productivity can be accorded to firm-level characteristics. This difference is not 
surprising; in market economies like Israel, allocation of factors of production across the 
economy, or across firms within industries, is efficient by the very nature of the factor 
markets. Hence, any changes in productivity have to come about from changes in firm-
level characteristics like managerial input and x-efficiency. However, in transition 
economies, firms and industries are in a state of disequilibrium in the short run, and 
allocative efficiency, therefore, becomes the main driver of productivity in these 
economies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
productivity firms within the industry. By the same logic, resources within the tobacco industry in Bulgaria 
were largely concentrated among inefficient firms within the industry, a result intuitively consistent with 
the fact that the tobacco industry in Bulgaria was a state-owned monopoly in the form of Bulgartabac.  
7   As in footnote 7, let us now explain how to interpret the Grilliches-Regev decomposition results reported 
in Tables 2 and 3, and, once again, let us focus on the food and beverage industry in Bulgaria (Table 2). 
The average productivity change for the food and beverage industry in Bulgaria, during 1995-99, was 
0.025. During the same period, the between component of productivity change was 0.033, while the within 
component of productivity change was –0.008. This implies that the overall increase in average 
productivity was driven largely by movement of labour from low productivity to higher productivity firms 
(between component being 0.033), and that this increase in average productivity at the industry level was 
offset by the decline in the average productivity of the firms themselves owing to non-labour related factors 
(between component being –0.008).   10
The descriptive statistics and the decompositions provide us with some priors, or testable 
hypotheses. First, in both Bulgaria and Romania, privately and foreign owned firms can 
be expected to be more active in altering the size of their labour force than the state-
owned firms, and perhaps even the firms with mixed ownership. Second, private or 
foreign ownership are likely to be associated with greater productivity changes in both 
countries, as compared with state-owned firms and those with mixed ownership. Third, 
changes in the size of the labour force, a proxy for firm-level structural changes, is likely 
to be an important determinant of firm-level productivity changes. These priors or 
hypotheses will be examined in the subsequent sections. 
 
3. Specification and Methodology 
As mentioned above, this paper explores two related phenomena, namely, the impact of 
firm and industry characteristics on firm-level labour turnover, as measured by 
employment growth,
8 and the impact of firm-level labour turnover on firm-level change 
in productivity. Following Konings (1997), Faggio (2001) and Konings, Kupets and 
Lehmannn (2003), we postulate that employment growth at the firm level is determined 
by the size
9 of the firm, agency issues captured by the firm’s ownership, industry-wide 
competition captured by the Herfindahl index and the import penetration index, and 
industry-specific effects captured by dummy variables. Further, we adapt the framework 
of Nickel (1996) and Estrin et al. (2001) to argue that firm-level labour productivity is a 
                                                 
8  Employment growth between periods t and t+1 was measured as ln Lt+1 – ln Lt, when L refers to the stock 
of labourers in a given time period. It is evident that the growth rate would encompass both job creation 
and job destructurion, and can be interpreted as net job creation. 
9 Following Konings, Kupets and Lehman (2003) we define size in period t as the average of the 
employment stocks of firm I in periods t and t-1.   11
function of employment turnover (as measured by employment growth), ownership, 
competition, and industry-specific factors captured by dummy variables. 
 
In other words, the specifications are given by the following: 
 
  (growth in employment)t = α 0t + α 1(size)t-1 + Σ iα 2i(ownership)i  
+ Σ jα 3j(competition)j + Σ kα 4k(industry)k + u  [1] 
  (change in labour productivity)t+1 = β 0 + β 1(growth in employment)t 
     +   Σ iβ 2i(ownership)i + Σ iβ 3j(competition)j 
     +   Σ kβ 4k(industry)k  +  v     [2] 
 
when i refers to the i-th form of ownership, j refers to the j-th form of competition, and k 
refers to the k-th industry. For both Bulgaria and Romania, i = 3, namely, domestic 
private, mixed ownership and foreign owned;
10 j = 2, namely, domestic competition as 
measured by the Herfindahl index, and foreign competition as measured by the import-
penetration index; and k = 22.
11 
 
It is evident that the system is recursive, and can hence be estimated separately using 
OLS. Further, since lagged values of size in specification [1] and of employment growth 
in specification [2] are being used, neither of the individual specifications suffers from an 
endogeneity problem. In keeping with Konings (1997) and Brown and Earle (2002b), we 
                                                 
10  State-owned firms comprise the omitted category. Note again that the data does not allow us to identify 
de novo firms, and hence we were unable to distinguish between privatized privately-owned firms and de 
novo privately-owned firms. 
11  There are 23 industries at the 2-digit NACE1 level, and one of them is the omitted category.   12
have used the latest ownership status of the firms to create the ownership dummies, i.e., 
the ownership status of the firms are time invariant. Further, following Brown and Earle 
(2002), we use the average of the import penetration ratios of all the available years 
obtained by the countries’ National Statistical Offices, to construct one index of foreign 
competition, such that this index too is time invariant. However, Herfindahl indices for 
each industry and for each year have been created using information provided by 
Amadeus, and are used for the estimation of the specifications. 
 
As mentioned earlier, competition might have different impact on the job flows and 
labour productivity of firms with different types of ownership, and hence specifications 
[1] and [2] have been augmented by interacting the ownership dummies with both 
Herfindahl indices and the import penetration index. In other words, the specifications 
eventually estimated are as follows: 
 
  (growth in employment)t = α 0t + α 1(size)t-1 + Σ iα 2i(ownership)i  
+ α 3,1(Herfindahl index)t + α 3,2(import penetration  
index) + Σ kα 4k(industry)k + Σ iα 5i(ownership)i ×  
(Herfindahl index)t + Σ iα 6i(ownership)i ×  (import 
 penetration index) + u   [1a] 
  (change in labour productivity)t+1 = β 0 + β 1(growth in employment)t 
+ Σ iβ 2i(ownership)i + β 3,1(Herfindahl index)t  
+ β 3,2(import penetration index) + Σ kβ 4k(industry)k  
+ Σ iβ 5i(ownership)i ×  (Herfindahl index)t    13
+ Σ iβ 6i(ownership)i ×  (import  penetration index)  
+   v        [ 2 a ]  
 
Specifications [1a] and [2a] are estimated using pooled cross-section data for the 1995-99 
time period. Since each of size, operating revenue and productivity are likely to be 
correlated across years, even as the independent variables are not significantly correlated 
among themselves, Huber-White robust estimators are used to estimate these 
specifications. The regression estimates are discussed in the forthcoming section of the 
paper. 
 
4. Regression Estimates 
The regression estimates are reported in Tables 4 through 7. Tables 4 and 5 report the 
regression coefficients for specification [1a], for Bulgaria and Romania respectively, 
while Tables 6 and 7 report the regression coefficients for specification [2a], for the two 
countries in the same order.  
 
4.1 Employment Growth 
The regression results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that, in both Bulgaria and Romania, 
smaller firms experienced greater growth in the size of their labour force than the larger 
firms. This finding is consistent with the existing literature (Konings, 1996; Konings, 
1997; Konings and Xavier, 2002). The difference between the two countries become 
apparent as soon as ownership is introduced to the specification (column 3). In Bulgaria, 
both privately owned firms and foreign firms experienced greater employment/labour   14
force growth than state-owned firms, and there was no significant difference between 
employment growth in state-owned firms and firms with mixed ownership. In Romania, 
on the other hand, privatization did not have any significant impact on firm-level 
employment growth; foreign firms in Romania experienced greater employment growth 
than state owned firms, while firms with mixed ownership experienced lower 
employment growth than state-owned firms. This suggests that there is a qualitative 
difference between the nature of privately owned firms and firms with mixed ownership 
in Bulgaria and Romania, and is consistent with the findings of Estrin at al. (2001).  
 
The impact of competition on employment/labour force growth also differs between these 
two countries (column 4). In Bulgaria, an increase in domestic competition, captured by 
(a decline in) the Herfindahl index, leads to higher employment growth, while an increase 
in foreign competition, captured by (an increase in) the index for import penetration, 
results in a decline in employment growth. The negative impact of import penetration on 
employment growth is easy to explain. Greater import penetration, in the absence of 
increasing export markets for Bulgarian firms (Yackimova, Bhaumik and Shivarov, 
2001), imply that there is a fall in the demand facing an average Bulgarian firm. This 
demand shock would translate into a decline in employment growth. The positive impact 
of domestic competition, captured by a decline in the Herfindahl index, on employment 
growth possibly manifests a state of the (transition) economy that is somewhat advanced 
towards the steady state of zero (net) employment growth (Bilsen and Konings, 1998).
12 
                                                 
12  According to Bilsen and Konings (1998), early stages of transition are market by rapid job destruction, 
as firms face competition and hard budget constraints for the first time. This is followed by increase in job 
creation as the surviving firms adjust to the new economic conditions, and in many cases the number of 
jobs created more than compensate for the number of jobs destroyed, leading to positive net employment   15
 
Interestingly, in Romania, import penetration does not have any impact on the 
employment growth of an average firm. This absence of an impact of a de facto demand 
shock on a key aspect for firm-level adjustment to shocks implies that either Romanian 
firms compensated for the increasing import penetration into Romanian markets by 
establishing toeholds in global export markets or, more probably, the Romanian firms 
were not behaving in a manner that is consistent with the neo-classical principle of cost 
minimization/profit maximization. Further, it is evident that, in Romania, an increase in 
domestic competition leads to a decline in employment growth, which, in the light of the 
Bilsen and Konings (1998) argument, suggests that during the 1995-99 period, the 
transition process in Romania was less advanced than the transition process in Bulgaria.  
 
The introduction of the interaction between ownership and domestic and foreign 
competition into the specification (column 5) indicates that competition has an impact 
only on the privately owned firms in Bulgaria. However, while the significance of the 
coefficient for the interaction between the private ownership dummy and the Herfindahl 
index remains robust to the introduction of industry dummies in the specification (column 
6), the introduction of the industry dummies results in the coefficient of the Herfindahl 
index regaining its significance. If the specification in column (6) is chosen as the best fit 
for the data, given that its R-square is (sometimes only marginally) higher than all other 
specifications presented in Table 4, the results imply that while competition affects all 
firms, it affects privately owned firms much more than other firms. 
                                                                                                                                                 
growth. Finally, towards the end to the process of transition, as the economy enters a condition of steady 
state, the number of jobs created equals the number of jobs destroyed, such that the net employment growth 
approximates zero.   16
 
As reported in Table 5, in Romania, on the other hand, introduction of the interaction 
terms (column 5) suggests that while employment growth in an average Romanian firm 
was negatively related to the extent of domestic competition, this negative relationship 
was much weaker for the privately owned firms. In other words, while even privately 
owned firms remained immune to foreign competition, they were possibly more evolved 
than the firms with other forms of ownership in so far as the transition path is concerned. 
 
It is evident that the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that, given that changes in 
the size of the labour force is a reaction to changes in firm-level or industry-level 
conditions, the behaviour of Bulgarian firms is consistent with the postulates of stylized 
theory. On the other hand, Romanian firms did not seem to have reacted to changes in 
ownership and degrees of competition, whether domestic or from abroad. Indeed, these 
firms seem to have reacted only to industry-specific factors unrelated to competition. 
Irrespective of whether these factors were economic or political in nature, to the extent 
that structural changes are supposed to induce firms to react to changes in ownership and 
the extent of competition, structural changes in Bulgaria seem to have been more 
successful until 1999 than structural changes in Romania. 
 
4.2 Changes in Labour Productivity 
Further evidence of the relatively more successful structural reforms in Bulgaria than in 
Romania can be found in the coefficient estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7. The 
coefficient estimates reported in Table 6 suggest that, in Bulgaria, firms that experienced   17
greater labour turnover also experienced greater growth rates in labour productivity 
(columns 1 and 2). This is consistent with our prior about the relationship between labour 
turnover and labour productivity at the firm-level. This result is robust with respect to 
introduction of ownership and competition controls, as well as industry-specific controls 
into the specification (columns 3 through 6). 
 
Also, in Bulgaria, all non-state-owned firms have higher labour productivity relative to 
the state-owned firms, and there is a hierarchy among these firms, namely, foreign-owned 
firms are the most productive, followed by privately owned firms, and, finally, by firms 
with mixed ownership (column 3). This hierarchy is consistent with the literature (Estrin 
et al., 2001; Brown and Earle, 2000) and with our priors about the relative productivity of 
firms with different types of ownership. With the exception of the coefficient for firms 
with mixed ownership, these results remain robust across specifications (columns 4 
through 6). 
 
The impact of competition on labour productivity in Bulgaria, however, is difficult to 
interpret, especially given the different impact of domestic and foreign competition on 
productivity. While a decrease in the Herfindahl index, i.e., an increase in domestic 
competition, does not significantly affect labour productivity of an average firm, a 
decrease in foreign competition leads to a decrease in labour productivity (column 4). 
Once interaction between ownership and competition are introduced into the specification 
(column 5), the impact of domestic competition on labour productivity becomes 
significant; (an increase in) competition is seen to have contributed to decline in labour   18
productivity. The introduction of industry-specific controls into the specification (column 
6), however, renders competition per se insignificant, and (domestic) competition is seen 
to have an impact only on privately owned firms. Specifically, the results suggest that, 
during 1995-99, domestic competition contributed to growth of labour productivity 
among privately owned firms in Bulgaria.  If, as before, we accept this specification as 
the best-fit on the basis of the R-square value, the impact of competition on labour 
productivity in Bulgaria is consistent with our prior; labour productivity increases with a 
decline in the Herfindahl index, i.e., with an increase in the extent of competition, albeit 
only for privately owned firms. 
 
As highlighted in Table 7, in Romania, as before, economic characteristics like labour 
turnover and competition do not seem to matter, in so far as determination of inter-firm 
variation in growth of labour productivity is concerned. Indeed, only ownership matters, 
albeit weakly. Once industry-specific controls are introduced into the specification, only 
foreign ownership seems to have had a significant and, as expected, positive impact on 
growth of labour productivity, relative to state-owned firms. Once again, privatization 
seems to have had no effect, in this case, on the productivity of firms. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
By all economic measures, Bulgaria and Romania are laggards among the transition 
economies of CEE. This is manifested by the fact that neither of them will join the 
expanded European Union in 2004. Interestingly, while the records of both countries with 
respect to domestic competition are roughly the same, the two countries have followed   19
very different paths of transition with respect to privatization and trade liberalization. 
Specifically, largely on account of the crisis of 1996-97, Bulgaria emerged a more open 
economy, and rapidly privatized most state-owned enterprises soon after the crisis.  
 
These differences seem to have opened up fundamental differences between behaviour of 
Bulgarian and Romanian firms. While the employment growth and growth of labour 
productivity of Bulgarian firms are driven by economic factors like size, ownership and 
competition, the inter-firm variation in employment and labour productivity growth in 
Romania is largely explained by industry-specific factors that are unrelated to domestic 
and foreign competition. Indeed, in Bulgaria, factors like size, ownership and competition 
affect employment growth in period t, and this job turnover in period t affects growth in 
labour productivity in period t+1, thereby completing an intuitively reasonable chain of 
events over time. In Romania, on the other hand, ownership and competition did not have 
any impact on employment growth (in period t) during 1995-99, nor did employment 
growth and competition have any impact on growth of labour productivity (in period 
t+1). 
 
Although this paper makes a significant contribution to the transition literature, by way of 
addressing the lacuna concerning the link between firm-level (labour) productivity 
growth and firm-level employment turnover in transition economies of CEE, it is not 
devoid of shortcomings. The most important shortcoming of the study is its inability to 
include in the sample exiting and entering firms that are an important part of the 
Schumpeterian dynamics, and its impact on productivity. Indeed, the absence of entering   20
and exiting firms in the sample may have contributed to a bias in our results concerning 
labour productivity. Given the stylized result that continuing firms are more productive 
than both entering and exiting firms (Olley and Pakes, 1996), our results are perhaps 
skewed in favour of firms that had better adapted to structural reforms. While this 
weakens the argument that an average Bulgarian firm had adapted significantly to the 
structural reforms during 1995-99, it strengthens the argument that Romanian firms had, 
on average, not evolved significantly in the process of transition. 
 
The second shortcoming of the paper lies in our inability to distinguish between 
privatized and de novo firms. Given that our sample constitutes of continuing firms 
during the 1995-99 period, we have eliminated from the sample the “young” de novo 
firms, once again skewing the results in favour of firms that had better adjusted to the 
structural reforms and the prevailing economic conditions. 
 
These shortcomings, which can be addressed as better quality data become available, 
however, do not bring into question the basic result of the paper, namely, that the 
structural reforms in Bulgaria, especially its privatization process, were perhaps more 
successful in transforming an average Bulgarian firm into a cost minimizing/profit 
maximizing economic agent than an average firm in Romania. Further, while the bias 
may have weakened the results per se, these results provide prima facie evidence that 
there exists a recursive relationship between job turnover and growth of labour 
productivity at the firm level.  
   21
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  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
BULGARIA 
All Firms 
Productivity 23786  24183  18382  18681  183681 
Employment 452  430  403  385  335 
Private Firms 
Productivity 26692  27045  20840  21538  19430 
Employment 494  474  448  435  396 
Foreign Firms 
Productivity 49055  53649  41828  51849  66601 
Employment 859  819  736  720  577 
Firms with Mixed Ownership 
Productivity 20159  20122  14181  13774  13121 
Employment 429  412  389  354  304 
State- Owned Firms 
Productivity 14161  15562  12254  10334  8184 
Employment 358  331  308  293  241 
ROMANIA 
All Firms 
Productivity 206512  202288  209721  304601  182816 
Employment 909  875  831  734  637 
Private Firms 
Productivity 207281  188591  157380  365079  170153 
Employment 685  643  617  561  497 
Foreign Firms 
Productivity 294388  343875  553605  295093  313269 
Employment 987  992  961  837  737 
Firms with Mixed Ownership 
Productivity 134158  149508  135485  135201  145392 
Employment 907  887  838  703  589 
State- Owned Firms 
Productivity 153429  151465  138667  138590  124928 
Employment 2042  1993  1841  1576  1321 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of Productivity 
Bulgarian Industries 
 


















10.25699 10.13441     0.15322     0.02557     0.03366  -  0.00809 
Tobacco  10.58057 10.65871 -  0.09767     0.00273     0.00609  -  0.00336 
Textiles    9.14968    8.94743    0.25281  - 0.00810  - 0.00125  - 0.00684 
Wearing 
Apparel 
  8.79023    8.61866    0.21446    0.03070    0.04523  - 0.01453 
Leather    8.78941    8.73280    0.07076  - 0.00295    0.00191  - 0.00486 
Wood    9.64318    9.39999    0.30398  - 0.00339  - 0.00318  - 0.00021 
Pulp & Paper    9.70837    9.46625    0.30265    0.00093    0.00305  - 0.00211 
Publishing 
and Printing 
12.01738 11.23185     0.98191 -  0.00472 -  0.00292  -  0.00180 
Coke & 
Petroleum 
12.01738    9.96356    0.00094    0.01400    0.01660  - 0.00260 
Chemicals  10.49584  10.07683    0.52376  - 0.00771  - 0.01218    0.00447 
Rubber & 
Plastic 




  9.84632    9.62774    0.27322  - 0.02116  - 0.01494  - 0.00622 
Basic Metals  10.31830    9.50693    1.01420  - 0.00697    0.00054  - 0.00752 
Fabricated 
Metals 
  9.31238    9.17404    0.17292  - 0.00044    0.00036  - 0.00081 
Machinery & 
Equipment 




  9.17835    8.94322    0.29390  - 0.00490  - 0.00513    0.00022 
Electrical 
Machinery 
  9.54078    9.44164    0.12391  - 0.01111  - 0.00964  - 0.00147 




  9.17722    9.23354  - 0.07040  - 0.00303  - 0.00239  - 0.00064 
Motor 
Vehicles 
  9.24492    9.16723    0.09712  - 0.01079  - 0.00858  - 0.00221 
Other 
Transport 
10.05854    9.83681    0.27715  - 0.01107  - 0.00924  - 0.00183 
Furniture    8.77054    8.64230    0.16030  - 0.00249    0.00021  - 0.00270 
Recycling    9.38577    9.45502  - 0.08656  - 0.00022  - 0.00003  - 0.00018 
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Table 3 
Decomposition of Productivity 
Romanian Industries 
 


















12.18085 12.23176 -  0.05090     0.02242     0.02266  -  0.00023 
Tobacco  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Textiles  11.13663  11.12861    0.00801    0.00372  - 0.00062    0.00434 
Wearing 
Apparel 
10.86508 10.96952 -  0.10443     0.10535     0.10303      0.00232 
Leather  10.73916 10.86836 -  0.12920     0.00438     0.00365      0.00072 
Wood  11.41247 11.71248 -  0.30000     0.00732     0.00722      0.00009 
Pulp & Paper  11.92455  11.80048    0.12406  - 0.01123  - 0.01132    0.00009 
Publishing 
and Printing 
12.28532 12.29357 -  0.00825     0.00238     0.00327  -  0.00088 
Coke & 
Petroleum 
13.10391 13.32601 -  0.22209 -  0.00751 -  0.00758      0.00007 
Chemicals  12.35088 12.21124     0.13963 -  0.01166 -  0.00784  -  0.00382 
Rubber & 
Plastic 




11.60583 11.65941 -  0.05358 -  0.00283 -  0.01273      0.00989 
Basic Metals  12.17471 11.89083     0.28387 -  0.01872 -  0.01575  -  0.00297 
Fabricated 
Metals 
11.39908 11.43695 -  0.03787     0.00488     0.00490  -  0.00002 
Machinery & 
Equipment 




N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Electrical 
Machinery 
11.64457 11.67793 -  0.03335 -  0.00572 -  0.00693      0.00120 




11.10215 11.18249 -  0.08033 -  0.00279 -  0.00322      0.00043 
Motor 
Vehicles 
11.90955  11.64193    0.26762  - 0.01765  - 0.02034    0.00269 
Other 
Transport 
11.96773  11.91066    0.05706    0.00612    0.00578    0.00034 
Furniture  11.25389  11.18149    0.07239    0.02248    0.01858    0.00390 
Recycling  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Employment Growth in Bulgaria 
 
Employment  Growth  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant    0.1928* 
  (0.0388) 
  0.2120* 
  (0.0395) 
  0.2214* 
  (0.0399) 
  0.2386* 
  (0.0401) 
  0.2239* 
  (0.0448) 
  0.2258* 
  (0.0505) 
Log Size (lagged 1 
period) 
- 0.0444* 
  (0.0068) 
- 0.0446* 
  (0.0068) 
- 0.0499* 
  (0.0068) 
- 0.0482* 
  (0.0069) 
- 0.0478* 
  (0.0069) 
- 0.0486* 
  (0.0072) 
Dummy Private         0.0526* 
  (0.0114) 
  0.05539* 
  (0.0114) 
  0.0856* 
  (0.0285) 
  0.0959* 
  (0.0304) 
Dummy Foreign         0.0688* 
  (0.0184) 
  0.0713* 
  (0.0186) 
  0.0942** 
  (0.0489) 
  0.1240* 
  (0.0463) 
Dummy Mixed 
Ownership 
   -  0.0102 
  (0.0101) 
- 0.0058 
  (0.0102) 
- 0.0037 
  (0.0273) 
  0.0119 
  (0.0290) 
Herfindahl Index       -  0.0664*** 
  (0.0393) 
- 0.0196 
  (0.0576) 
- 0.2219** 
  (0.0895) 
Import Penetration       -  0.0644** 
  (0.0288) 
- 0.0367 
  (0.0607) 
- 0.0709 
  (0.0887) 
Private*Herfindahl       -  0.1469*** 
  (0.0807) 
- 0.1789** 
  (0.0886) 
Foreign*Herfindahl           0.1029 
  (0.1335) 
  0.0496 
  (0.1619) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Herfindahl 
     -  0.0275 
  (0.0953) 
- 0.0749 
  (0.0906) 
Private*Import 
Penetration 
     -  0.0529 
  (0.0788) 
- 0.0590 
  (0.0824) 
Foreign*Import 
Penetration 
     -  0.1056 
  (0.1264) 
- 0.1506 
  (0.1345) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Import Penetration 
     -  0.0052 
  (0.0728) 
- 0.0130 
  (0.0758) 
Year Dummies    No    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes* 
Industry Dummies    No    No    No    No    No    Yes** 
 
F test    42.57    27.18    10.52    17.13    11.00    5.57 
R
2    0.0188    0.0353    0.0473    0.0510    0.0526    0.0601 
No. of Observations    4031    4031    4031    4019    4019    4019 
  Note: Values within parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   30
Table 5 
Determinants of Employment Growth in Romania 
 
Employment  Growth  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant    0.8212* 
  (0.0572) 
  0.8857* 
  (0.0585) 
  0.8729* 
  (0.0683) 
  0.8784* 
  (0.0677) 
  0.8639* 
  (0.0688) 
  0.8439* 
  (0.0709) 
Log Size (lagged one 
period) 
- 0.1418* 
  (0.0091) 
- 0.1412* 
  (0.0089) 
- 0.1398* 
  (0.0094) 
- 0.1434* 
  (0.0098) 
- 0.1430* 
  (0.0099) 
- 0.1432* 
  (0.0104) 
Dummy Private     -  0.0026 
  (0.0176) 
  0.0031 
  (0.0175) 
  0.0284 
  (0.0279) 
  0.0055 
  (0.0270) 
Dummy Foreign         0.0661* 
  (0.0213) 
  0.0681* 
  (0.0214) 
  0.0477 
  (0.0369) 
  0.0188 
  (0.0363) 
Dummy Mixed 
Ownership 
   -  0.0407*** 
  (0.0206) 
- 0.0347*** 
  (0.0208) 
- 0.0239 
  (0.0351) 
- 0.0151 
  (0.0355) 
Herfindahl Index           0.2561** 
  (0.1026) 
  0.5266** 
  (0.2369) 
  0.4822 
  (1.714) 
Import Penetration           5.91e-06 
  (0.0001) 
- 0.0001 
  (0.0002) 
- 0.0001 
  (0.0005) 
Private*Herfindahl       -  0.4779*** 
  (0.2598) 
- 0.2924 
  (0.2464) 
Foreign*Herfindahl       -  0.0616 
  (0.3297) 
  0.0764 
  (0.3069) 
Mixed*Herfindahl       -  0.3122 
  (0.4112) 
- 0.3447 
  (0.4014) 
Private*Import 
Penetration 
         0.0000 
  (0.0002) 
  0.0000 
  (0.0002) 
Foreign*Import 
Penetration 
         0.0003 
  (0.0003) 
  0.0003 
  (0.0003) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Import Penetration 
         0.0001 
  (0.0003) 
- 0.0000 
  (0.0003) 
Year Dummies    No    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes* 
Industry Dummies    No    No    No    No    No    Yes* 
 
F test    242.3    96.02    57.77    44.27    26.93    17.72 
R
2    0.1434    0.1557    0.1592    0.1606    0.1616    0.1778 
No. of Observations    4206    4206    4206    4152    4152    4152 
  Note: Values within parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   31
Table 6 
Determinants of Growth in Labour Productivity in Bulgaria 
 
Labour  Productivity  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant  - 0.0877* 
  (0.0072) 
- 0.1383* 
  (0.0130) 
- 0.1794* 
  (0.0159) 
- 0.2174* 
  (0.0241) 
- 0.2489* 
  (0.0349) 
- 0.2005* 
  (0.0427) 
Net Employment 
Growth (lagged 1 pd) 
  0.0704*** 
  (0.0359) 
  0.0636*** 
  (0.0359) 
  0.0676*** 
  (0.0359) 
  0.0726** 
  (0.0359) 
  0.0739** 
  (0.0359) 
  0.0799** 
  (0.0361) 
Dummy Private         0.0589* 
  (0.0163) 
  0.0551* 
  (0.0162) 
  0.0805*** 
  (0.0446) 
  0.0801*** 
  (0.0465) 
Dummy Foreign         0.1215* 
  (0.0344) 
  0.1164* 
  (0.0349) 
  0.2736* 
  (0.0969) 
  0.2525** 
  (0.0995) 
Dummy Mixed 
Ownership 
       0.0401*** 
  (0.0179) 
  0.0338*** 
  (0.0176) 
  0.0609 
  (0.0496) 
  0.0261 
  (0.0499) 
Herfindahl Index           0.1089 
  (0.0764) 
  0.2296** 
  (0.1036) 
  0.1303 
  (0.5758) 
Import Penetration           0.0904*** 
  (0.0516) 
  0.1587*** 
  (0.0927) 
  0.0818 
  (0.1558) 
Private*Herfindahl       -  0.2174 
  (0.1355) 
- 0.3201** 
  (0.1556) 
Foreign*Herfindahl       -  0.1271 
  (0.2938) 
- 0.0292 
  (0.2916) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Herfindahl 
     -  0.0202 
  (0.2213) 
- 0.0485 
  (0.1682) 
Private*Import 
Penetration 
     -  0.0282 
  (0.1174) 
- 0.0349 
  (0.1191) 
Foreign*Import 
Penetration 
     -  0.4264 
  (0.3181) 
- 0.4100 
  (0.3248) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Import Penetration 
     -  0.0790 
  (0.1251) 
- 0.0178 
  (0.1259) 
Year Dummies    No    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes* 
Industry Dummies    No    No    No    No    No    Yes* 
 
F test    3.85    20.91    13.76    10.72    7.61    4.29 
R
2    0.0014    0.0216    0.0255    0.0272    0.0288    0.0365 
N Observations    3166    3166    3166    3166    3166    3166 
Note: Values within parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   32
Table 7 
Determinants of Labour Productivity in Romania 
Labour  Productivity  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant    0.0079 
  (0.0058) 
  0.0141 
  (0.0101) 
- 0.0346** 
  (0.0140) 
- 0.0379** 
  (0.0179) 
- 0.0266 
  (0.0253) 
- 0.0214 
  (0.0293) 
Net Employment 
Growth (lagged 1 pd) 
  0.0156 
  (0.0157) 
  0.0172 
  (0.0155) 
  0.0150 
  (0.0155) 
  0.0152 
  (0.0156) 
  0.0167 
  (0.0159) 
  0.0132 
  (0.0159) 
Dummy Private         0.0577* 
  (0.0148) 
  0.0578* 
  (0.0153) 
  0.0364 
  (0.0284) 
  0.0241 
  (0.0289) 
Dummy Foreign         0.0617** 
  (0.0244) 
  0.0615** 
  (0.0243) 
  0.1073** 
  (0.0435) 
  0.0993** 
  (0.0435) 
Dummy Mixed 
Ownership 
       0.0408** 
  (0.0244) 
  0.0399** 
  (0.0178) 
- 0.0071 
  (0.0333) 
- 0.0216 
  (0.0325) 
Herfindahl Index           0.0050 
  (0.1234) 
  0.0949 
  (0.1683) 
- 1.505 
   (1.979) 
Import Penetration           0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
- 0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
  0.0003 
  (0.0005) 
Private*Herfindahl       -  0.0381 
  (0.2647) 
  0.2597 
  (0.2701) 
Foreign*Herfindahl       -  0.4019 
  (0.2787) 
- 0.2298 
  (0.2852) 
Mixed*Herfindahl       -  0.1825 
  (0.3102) 
  0.1756 
  (0.3144) 
Private*Import 
Penetration 
         0.0003 
  (0.0002) 
  0.0001 
  (0.0002) 
Foreign*Import 
Penetration 
     -  0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
- 0.0004 
  (0.0003) 
Mixed Ownership* 
Import Penetration 
         0.0006** 
  (0.0002) 
  0.0004 
  (0.0002) 
Year Dummies    No    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes*    Yes* 
Industry Dummies    No    No    No    No    No    Yes* 
 
F test    0.99    8.33    7.11    5.44    4.33    5.25 
R
2    0.3195    0.0096    0.0112    0.0113    0.0126    0.0246 
No. of Observations    4236    4236    4236    4236    4236    4236 
  Note: Values within parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   33
APPENDIX I 




The first law governing privatization in 
Bulgaria was enacted in 1992, laying down 
a framework for denationalization via open 
tenders, auctions, direct negotiations and 
MEBO’s. While political stalemate 
obstructed real progress till the mid-1995s, 
moderate preferences given to employees 
resulted in insignificant insider ownership 
amounting to less that 20% of the 
privatizable property. Impetus to 
privatization was given after the financial 
crisis of 1996-1997, by introducing mass 
privatization (allowing for launch of 
privatization funds in a competitive way), 
and simultaneously initiating fast sell- off 
of shares of state-owned enterprises for 
cash. By the end of 1999 the extent of 
privatization of the chemical, food, 
metallurgical, electrical, machine building 
and construction industries were 83.2 
percent, 92 percent, 89 percent, 70 percent, 
50 percent and 61.9 percent, respectively. 
The legal basis for commercialization of 
state owned enterprises in Romania was 
given by Law 58 of 1991 which entrusted 
70 percent of the privatizable property to 
State Ownership Fund acting as a trustee 
and negotiator with potential investors; and 
the remaining 30% to five private funds 
(POF) having the status of joint-stock 
companies meant to serve as a mutual fund 
operating on commercial basis. Previously, 
regies autonomes, or non-privatisable 
companies were excluded of the list of 
companies subject to privatization. Little 
progress in denationalization- apart from a 
substantial amount of property going to 
MEBO- was made till the start up of mass 
privatization in 1995, when 4000 of the 
63000 commercial companies still in state 
hands, and constituting the 30% property 
belonging to POFs were included in the 
mass privatization program. While 
according to Earle and Telegdi (1998) mass 
privatization achieved little in 
denationalizing the Romanian economy, 
impetus was given to sell off of enterprises 
for cash, especially in the post 1996 period. 
However, by 2000 less than 60% of the 
state owned property in Romania was 
privatized (European Commission, 2000, 
IMF, 2000). 
Competition Policy 
The first law on Protection of Competition 
in Bulgaria was adopted in 1991 and was 
significantly revised in 1998 to make it 
compatible with the EU legislation. Indeed, 
while prior to 1995 most of the cases dealt 
with involved enforcement of private 
contracts and property rights, later 
amdendments addressed hard-core anti-
trust issues such as block exemption of 
vertical agreements and horizontal 
The Law on Protection of Competition was 
enacted in Romania in 1997 and was 
drafted along the requirements of the 
acquis communautaire of the EU.  By the 
end of 1998 Romania’s anti-trust 
legislation was largely in line with that of 
the EU, however secondary legislation still 
needs to be adopted to take into account 
EUs new vertical restraints policy and its 
policy on horizontal agreements. While   34
cooperation agreements. However, while 
antitrust legislation is deemed developing 
in a satisfactory manner by the EU, 
monitoring and control of state aid is 
deemed as unsatisfactory and in need of 
improvement. 
existing legislation covers the basic 
principles of state aid control, a lot need to 
be done in its monitoring and 
implementation. 
Trade Liberalisation 
During its transition, Bulgaria has achieved 
a a high degree of trade liberalization by 
international standards. In 1991 itself it 
liberalized most prices, removed import 
controls and adopted a unified exchange 
rate, while maintaining export control on 
essential inputs. While it partially reversed 
liberalization in 1994-96 and in the crisis 
year 1996 in introduced a temporary import 
surcharge, overall it emerged as top 20% 
among IMF members in terms of openness, 
with a present IMF rating of 2. However, 
while lots of progress has been made in the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, and 
Bulgaria’s MFN tariff is around the 
world’s average, it remains higher than that 
in many of its neighbours and the EU. 
Agricultural goods continue to benefit from 
higher tariff protection than the rest of the 
economy, and among EU candidates only 
Poland and Romania have higher MFN 
tariffs than Bulgaria. 
Compared to other CEE economies, 
Romania followed a more gradual regime 
with respect to trade liberalization. It 
unified its exchange rate in 1997 and 
reduced tariffs and price controls, 
achieving full current account liberalization 
only in 1998.  By IMF standards, together 
with Poland, Romania is classified as one 
of the less open economies in CEE with an 
average rating of 4. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
One of the main questions that this paper aims to answer is the question of whether the 
massive job reallocation during Bulgaria’s and Romania’s transitions contributed to 
productivity growth, or whether, on the contrary, it led to the elimination of the more 
productive jobs. We try to answer this question by Olley-Pakes decomposition, which 
looks at the distribution of labour and productivity across firms in each industry at a point 
in time, and by Griliches- Regev decomposition, which looks at the separate role of job 
reallocation and firm level productivity increases or decreases on overall productivity 
dynamics of firms in 2-digit industrial sectors. We then take the average of those 
decompositions for the 1995-1999 period and report them in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
A. Olley-Pakes Decomposition 
Olley and Pakes (1996) conduct cross sectional decomposition of labour productivity in 
the following manner: 
 
) )( ( P P S S P P i i et i et i it − − + = ∑  
 
where Pit is the industrial weighted productivity for each time period, Pi is the average 
industrial unweighted productivity and  ) )( ( P P S S i i et i et − − ∑ is the sum of the 
productivity markups of each firm over the average industrial productivity, weighted by 
the difference of firm-level emoloyment shares and the average employment share of the 
industry.  A positive cross- term [ ) )( ( P P S S i i et i et − − ∑ ]  means that activity is   36
disproportionately allocated in high productive firms, while a negative cross-term means 
that activity is disproportionately allocated in low productivity firms. 
 
B. Grilliches-Regev Decomposition 
Griliches and Regev (1995) decompose the change in firm’s contribution in terms of 
productivity, weighted by employment, to the total in the following manner: 
 
P dS dP S P S P S t t t t . .
1 1 + = −
− −  
 
where dP = Pt-Pt-1 and dS = St – St-1 and S is, as in the Olley- Pakes decomposition, the 
share of firm’s employment in the employment of the respective industry. The first term 
in the above decomposition (a within- firm productivity growth) shows the contribution 
of non- employment based factors on industrial productivity growth. The second term 
(between firm productivity growth), shows the employment reallocation contribution to 
industrial productivity growth. 
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